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The sandbox

Claude scatters scratch and temporary files across /tmp. The sandbox funnels them into one directory — /tmp/claude — so you can grant destructive permissions scoped to that directory with confidence, while the rest of the filesystem stays gated.

Three mechanisms cooperate:

  1. Sandbox creation — the SessionStart hook runs mkdir -p /tmp/claude.
  2. Guidance — a session-start line tells Claude to use the sandbox.
  3. Input redirection — fencepost rewrites /tmp paths to the sandbox in tool inputs, and rules allow destructive ops confined to it.

Redirection​

When enabled, fencepost rewrites references to the system temp root in tool inputs:

Input pathRewritten to
/tmp/foo/tmp/claude/foo
/tmp (bare, at a boundary)/tmp/claude
/tmp/claude/foounchanged (already in the sandbox)
/var/tmp/xunchanged (not the system temp root)
/tmpfileunchanged (not a /tmp path)

It's a pragmatic string rewrite with a path-boundary lookbehind, not a full shell parser. The rewritten field depends on the tool:

ToolField rewritten
Bashcommand
Read / Write / Editfile_path
NotebookEditnotebook_path

When it happens​

Redirection runs before evaluation, so rules and the audit log see the path the tool will actually use:

tool_input → redirect → evaluate(rewritten) → format(result, updatedInput)

When the input changed, the decision JSON carries updatedInput so the tool runs against the sandbox path (applied on allow/ask; irrelevant on deny). On an allow with a rewrite, fencepost emits an explicit allow output instead of the empty-stdout fast path, so the rewrite isn't lost.

Config​

redirect:
tmp: true # rewrite /tmp → tmpTarget (default false at the core level)
tmpTarget: /tmp/claude # destination dir, must start with /tmp/

redirect is block-level last-wins. The core default is off; the claude preset turns it on. The target must start with /tmp/ (nested targets like /tmp/agents/claude work); any other target makes redirection a no-op.

Scoped destructive permissions​

The point of one sandbox dir is that you can safely allow destructive operations inside it. The recommended way is structured arguments rules, which are correct for multi-target commands: see A complete sandbox policy for the full rule set.

With those rules, rm -rf /tmp/claude/build is allowed; rm -rf /tmp/claude/build /etc is not (one argument escapes), so it falls through to ask/default.

allowChecks alternative

An older approach uses a $-anchored allowChecks regex. It only confines a single target, so two-path commands (cp, mv) are intentionally excluded. Prefer the structured arguments rules above; the claude preset has migrated to them.

Limitations​

  • Redirection is string-based. An unusual command that embeds /tmp in a non-path context could be rewritten. Disable with redirect: { tmp: false } if that bites.
  • Scoped allows sit below deny/checks in precedence. If another preset adds a recursive-delete deny check, it shadows the sandbox allow. Scope such checks to exclude /tmp/claude if you want both.